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"White-collar crime" has become a catchall label for a wide variety of
economic wrongdoing.' If necessary research into white collar crime is to be
useful, it must focus precisely upon relevant parts of the problem. This article
focuses upon one such part-wrongdoing by corporations. It is important to
deal separately with corporate deviance because much of the literature has
failed to separate the problems of organizational behavior from that of behavior
of natural persons. 2 As one commentator has phrased the problem, "It is ap-
parent that the present criminal process, which developed as a reaction to in-
dividual delinquency, has not yet reached a level of sophistication which
enables it effectively to sort out the various components in the complex of legal
relationships known as the corporation. "13
Instead of coming to grips with the corporate organization, the criminal
law proceeded to apply the natural person model to the fictional corporate per-
son. The anthropomorphization of the corporation has thoroughly infected
legal thought. When Christopher Stone suggested that trees should have
standing, 4 readers-at least those east of the Rockies-reacted good-naturedly,
albeit with disbelief, to a notion that must have been produced only by overex-
posure to the California sun. Yet when the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice wrote in a single sentence of
"derelictions by corporations and their managers,' '5 not an eyebrow was
raised. The natural person's relation to the corporate organization has gone
beyond metaphor. A T & T has indeed become "Ma Bell," and has a per-
sonhood in the law which is denied to other objects. 6 This anthropomorphiza-
tion of the corporation has facilitated application of traditional notions of
criminality to the corporate organization.
To deal adequately with corporate deviance, the massive underbrush of
doctrine stemming from the too-facile application of notions of individual
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., Ohio State University, 1962; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1965; LL.M., Georgetown University, 1967. Member of the Ohio bar.
I One researcher has identified 61 different kinds of white-collar crime in four broad categories. See H.
EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 73-75 (1970).
2 A few notable exceptions which recognize the problem of organizational behavior do exist, e.g., M.D.
ERMANN and R.J. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (1978); Note, Decisionmaking Models
and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
3 Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J.
280, 303 (1961).
4 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?- Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972).
5 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT
CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 104 (1967).
6 See A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 154-61 (1976).
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responsibility to corporations must be cleared. To do so, an organizational
model which has not been "personated" may be useful. Such a model, one
with both historical roots and modern roles much like those of the modern
business corporation, does exist. That model is the municipal corporation.
This often forgotten organizational form may assist in some contexts in shed-
ding light upon the appropriate treatment of its sibling, the large, publicly
held, politically powerful modern corporation.
Two major areas are to be examined. One involves the issue of when the
corporate organization is responsible for actions of its agents. Current law is
confusing because established notions of responsibility developed in the law of
agency are not consistently applied in criminal contexts. The second area in-
volves the availability of constitutional criminal protections for the corporate
entity. Current law fails consistently to take account of the peculiar
characteristics of the large publicly held corporation in determining the ap-
plicability of bill of rights protection. The following analysis is not designed to
analyze the current state of the law. Rather, it is directed at formulating a con-
sistent framework for what the law should be in these areas, while suggesting
that sufficient foundations exist in current case law to permit judicial im-
plementation of the proposed model.
II. Some Preliminary Considerations
A. The First Layer of Confusion- The Two Faces of the Corporation
It is well understood that the large, powerful publicly held corporation
poses substantially different problems of deviant behavior than does the tax-
motivated incorporated small business partnership. Dean Blumberg has
described the phenomenon effectively:
In addition to its predominant economic role in providing goods, ser-
vices, and employment, the megacorporation has developed into a social and
political organization of profound significance. In fact, it has become a basic
social institution and a center of power resembling governmental structures. 7
However, courts have often failed to take account of the special organizational
attributes of the large publicly held corporation. Broad holdings, shaped upon
the model of the individual entrepreneur, are applied without distinction to the
impersonal large corporation as well .8 Two examples in the area of criminal
constitutional protection illustrate the point.
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 9 the Supreme Court applied the fourth
amendment's provisions to prohibit a warrantless inspection under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of the business premises of an apparently
7 P.I. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER 1
(1975).
8 This stems, in part, from the relative scarcity of prosecutions directed at publicly held companies. See
Taubman, U.S. Attack on Corporate Crime Yields Handful of Cases in 2 Years, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1979, at 1,
col. 5.
9 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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small, local electrical, plumbing and air-conditioning contractor. 10 In so
holding the Court emphasized the historical origins of the fourth amendment:
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the colonies
immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offenisiveness it
engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose
premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several
parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists."
Whatever the concerns of the small colonial American businessman, his
shop was a far cry from the large national and multinational corporation of the
1970's. However, two weeks after its decision in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the
Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of Barlow's and of
another opinion involving individual defendants, 12 the case of Consolidation Coal
Co. v. U.S.13 Consolidation Coal Co. operated fifty-five mines in seven states
and had an interest in a Canadian mine. Moreover, it was a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Continental Oil Co., a New York Stock Exchange listed company
operating in thirty countries.' 4 Yet the Court gave no suggestion that Con-
solidation should be treated any differently as to searches of its premises in con-
nection with alleged violations of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969 than if it were a natural person or small business.
The same refusal to take separate account of the large publicly held cor-
poration can be seen in the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Security
National Bank. 15 Holding that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment applies to corporations, the court remarked:
The small entrepreneur is not spared the embarrassment, expense, anxie-
ty and insecurity resulting from repeated trials on criminal charges, simply
because he has incorporated his modest business. That a large corporation
may have more substantial financial resources is no more valid ground for
depriving it of its constitutional rights than is possession of greater wealth by
an individual.' 6
Rationales such as this fail to recognize the qualitative difference between a
powerful economic-political corporate organization on the one hand and the
small business on the other, where by contrast with the large corporation, the
personality of its principals is retained.
Until courts recognize in the area of criminal law, the qualitative dif-
ferences between the large, modern publicly held corporation and small
business, analysis will be impeded.
10 Appellee's brief describes Barlow's, Inc., an Idaho corporation located in Pocatello, which for ap-
proximately seventeen years operated in the Pocatello vicinity. No aspect of the business was licensed by any
federal agency. Brief for Appellee at 1, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., Id.
11 436 U.S. at 311 (footnotes omitted).
12 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
13 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
14 [1978] STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATE RECORDS 5665 (figures as of December 31, 1977).
15 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
16 Id. at 494.
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B. The Wages of Permissiveness: Frustrated Development of Internal Controls
A primary theme of students of the large modern corporation is that of
responsibility. The twin questions of the legitimacy and the accountability of
those who control the corporation have been the center of raging debate.1 7
Despite massive efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission through
its proxy rules, effective shareholder control in large corporations remains
elusive.1 8 Management self-perpetuation is the norm.
An examination of the related municipal corporation reveals some surpris-
ing contrasts. Cities of one million or more inhabitants are not governed by un-
controlled managers. Effective political systems operate in these municipal cor-
porations. The very political power which seems most difficult to check in the
modern business corporation is harnessed in the municipal corporation. In-
deed, in its origin, the corporation was viewed as primarily a political organiza-
tion. At the end of the eighteenth century, Stuart Kyd's classic British Treatise
on the Law of Corporations made no significant distinction between municipal cor-
porations created for the purpose of local government, and business corpora-
tions established for purposes of trade, manufacture or commerce.' 9
The development of effective political control in the municipal corporation
can probably be traced to three differences between the contemporary govern-
ment of municipal and business corporations. First, the municipal corporation
adopted, and became constitutionally required to abide by, a one-person one-
vote principle. Second, leaving the municipal constituency has often been more
difficult than fleeing from the constituency of the business corporation. Third,
the federal courts were enabled to exercise supervision over unreasonable
municipal action by way of the fourteenth amendment and legislation enacted
pursuant to it. The courts refused, by and large, to subject business corpora-
tions to the same constitutional constraints. As the following examination will
demonstrate, in each of these situations parallel controls upon municipal and
business corporations failed to develop. In each case, basic laissez-faire
economic notions resulted in a governmental permissiveness which frustrated
the development of effective internal political control in the business corpora-
tion.
The current voting pattern in business corporations of one-share one-vote
did not become universally established until well into the 19th century. Prior to
this, a one-person one-vote rule, or a modified version at least limiting the
power of large shareholders, was prevalent. 20 The movement to one-share one-
vote appears to have been motivated by pressure from the large shareholders2'
and by the ease with which voting restrictions could be evaded through the
transfer of shares to nominees. 22 In the municipal corporation, similar
17 See, e.g., THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (E.S. Mason ed. 1960).
18 See, e.g., A.F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE §§ 204, 206 (1976).
19 I.S. KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 28-29 (Garland Ser. 1978) (n.p. 1793). See also
Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort
Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937).
20 See Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One
Vote, " 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1970).
21 2 J. DAVis, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATION 324 (1917).
22 Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 (pt. 2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 156-58
(1888).
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pressures have been increasingly resisted. Limitation of voting rights to those
who own substantial property, once prevalent, has been universally rejected. 23
Similarly, attempts to increase political voting power through the use of un-
qualified nominees has been vigorously prosecuted as vote buying and election
fraud. 24
The conflict between the municipal and business corporation model of
voting is illustrated by the case of Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District.25 The
California Water Storage District Act authorized formation of water storage
districts as governmental units to plan and execute water projects. In 1969, the
board of the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District voted six-four to table a
motion that would have required diversion of water which ultimately flooded
the land and homes of residents. The vote was motivated by the interest of the
dominant landowner in the district in avoiding interference that would have
been caused to the following season's crop production by diversion. 26 As the
California statute required, the board was elected pursuant to a business cor-
poration model-one vote for each $100 of land owned. 27 At issue was whether
the governing body of the district must instead be elected on a one-person one-
vote basis by its fifty-nine adult residents. 28 The majority opinion of the United
States Supreme Court upheld against an equal protection clause challenge the
business corporation model, with majority board control thus vested in one
corporate landowner. 29
Not only does the municipality have a greater dispersion of political
responsibility, but the municipality also poses greater barriers to departure
from the relevant voting constituency. Professor Conard describes the degree
of effective corporate shareholder control on the basis of "the switch-or-fight
balance," 3 0 i.e., the easier it is to sell out one's stock holdings, the less one will
fight through internal political mechanisms. It is, of course, not impossible to
leave the municipal constituency, e.g., by moving outside its political
boundaries. The growth of attractive suburbs gives witness to this possibility.
In the case of the large, publicly held business corporation, however, creating
the ability to switch, i.e., creating a strong liquid securities market which en-
courages trading has been a central feature of federal policy:
A major goal and ideal of 'the securities markets and the securities in-
dustry has been the creation of a strong central market system for securities of
national importance, in which all buying and selling interest in these securities
could participate and be represented under a competitive regime. 31
This has been reflected in legislation creating the framework for a national
23 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-86 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24 See, e.g., 29 C.J.S. Elections §5 323-26 (1965).
25 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
26 Id. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 724 n.6.
28 See id. at 723.
29 Id. at 735, 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30 A.F. CONARD, supra note 18, at § 203.
31 Letter from Richard B. Smith (SEC Commissioner) to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives (March 10, 1971), reprinted in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE
SEC AT XXiV (Summary Vol., 1971).
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market system. Congressional findings embodied in statute establish
''economically efficient execution of securities transactions" as a major goal. 32
Finally, the failure of the courts to subject corporate action generally to the
constraints of the fourteenth amendment has often been commented upon. 33
The fact alone of incorporation by the state does not sufficiently implicate the
state in activities of a business to trigger due process and equal protection
limitation upon corporate action.3 4 Municipal corporations, however, are
viewed as state instrumentalities subject to fourteenth amendment constraints.
The presence of a federal judicial forum in which to test the reasonableness of
actions of municipal officials35 has encouraged the development of internal con-
trols in the municipality which have not developed in the business corporation.
Beyond this, the failure to characterize the action of powerful corporations as
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes reinforces the equation of such
corporations with natural persons-a development which, as discussed below,
has led to confusion in designing methods for restraining corporate deviance.
III. Applying Criminal Sanctions to the Corporation
A. The Problem
The lack of perceived internal checks on deviant behavior by business cor-
porations makes the corporate entity a ready target for the imposition of exter-
nal constraints. Increasingly, the external constraint of first choice is the
criminal law. Public outcries against governmental wrongdoing invariably
focus upon sanctioning of governmental officials. 36 Public outcries against
business excesses generally focus in an undiscriminating manner on both cor-
porate officials and the corporate entity as appropriate objects of punishment.37
Among the earliest examples of criminal prosecution of corporations are
indictments of municipalities, 38 and criminal sanctions continue to be an
available alternative for municipal deviance, at least where the relevant
criminal statute does not require intent. 39 However, the general public
understands that municipalities and other governmental entities are organiza-
tions. The organizational nature of the business corporation, however, has
become subsumed in its "personality." In the words, for example, of Judge
Coffin:
It is true that corporations do not have human emotions, but that does
not mean that they do not "suffer" during criminal trials in the sense of ex-
periencing harm to a legitimate, protectible interest .... A corporation that
falls out of favor with society will suffer. Its suffering may be of a different
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 lIA(a)(1)(c)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(c)(i) (1976).
33 E.g., A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 182-87.
34 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
35 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
36 See, e.g., Clinard & Quinney, Crime by Government, cited by M.D. ERMANN & R.J. LUNDMAN, COR-
PORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE 137 (1978).
37 See, e.g., Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, cited by R. NADER & M. GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 182 (1973).
38 See Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 85-96 (1976).
39 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW S 16.65 (1979). See generally Barnett, The Criminal
Liability of American Municipal Corporations, 17 ORE. L. REV. 289 (1938).
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character than an individual's, but that does not make those sufferings any the
less real or hazardous. ... Corporations can be made very insecure by pro-
longed periods of bad publicity. 40
With corporate personhood come the twin personal attributes of free will
and moral responsibility. 41 Much of the concern about corporate criminality
turns upon how to conceptualize these corporate attributes. When does a cor-
poration have the appropriate criminal intent to justify its being punished?
What protections, beyond those available in civil actions, should be applicable
to the process in which the corporation is branded an outlaw? Much of the
desire to apply criminal rather than civil, sanctions to the corporation stems
from the moral judgment implicit in conviction.
A phenomenon often noted is the lack of social stigma attached to criminal
conviction of individual corporate officers for white collar crimes. 42 This
perception may be related to the notion that the corporate entity can be
possessed of moral fault. The individual then becomes the "innocent victim"
of an evil system, rather than the responsible moral cause. 43 Seldom does the
perception of organizational guilt coupled with individual innocence occur in
the case of municipal wrongdoing. Occasionally, however, as in the case of war
crimes, the notion is seen in the context of governmental organizations.44 It
may not be coincidental that it is in time of war that the state is most nearly
perceived as the "group-person.'45
B. Clearing Some More Underbrush- The Overlapping Tests of
Authority, Knowledge and Intent
Corporate criminal liability developed originally only as to crimes for
which no mens rea was required. 46 Criminal liability of municipal corporations
is still limited to these situations. 47 In such cases of strict liability, despite the
personification of the corporation, an additional evidentiary element usually
not present when the defendant is a natural person is introduced. It must be
determined whether the particular action involved was performed "on behalf
of" the corporate entity. If it was, then criminal liability may result.4 8
The law of organizations, i.e., agency law, has a well-developed structure
for determining whether an act was "on behalf of" an organization. When
delictual conduct is at issue, the relevant test is whether the actor was in the
scope of his employment. The Restatement of Agency (Second) describes the test as
follows:
40 United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 1978).
41 See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1241-43 (1979).
42 See, e.g., Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, cited
by G. GEIS & R.F. MEIER, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 296, 304-08 (rev. ed. 1977).
43 But see Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1369-75 (proposing a movement primarily toward
civil fines to deter corporate illegality).
44 See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, B. MARSHALL &J. SCHWARTZ, THE My LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP
7-10 (1976).
45 See A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 154-61.
46 See Elkins, supra note 38, at 85-96.
47 See 17 E. MCQUILLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 49.88 (3d ed. 1968); 2 C. ArNrIAu,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 16.65 (1979).
48 See New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if but only if. (a)
it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a pur-
pose to serve the master; and, (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. 49
Thus in Egan v. United States,50 Union Electric Co. was convicted of
violating provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act prohibiting
certain political contributions because its officers acted within the scope of their
employment in making such contributions. In cases such as this where the rele-
vant statute requires no mens rea, the question of imputing knowledge or in-
tent to the corporation is irrelevant. When, however, a corporation is charged
with a crime involving mens rea, additional complications are introduced. Not
only must the actions be within the actor's scope of employment, but also the
relevant state of mind must be found as to the corporate defendant. It is at this
point that analytical obscurity has created massive confusion. One source of
the confusion has resulted from the previously noted personification of the cor-
porate entity. Instead of exploring the issue of when particular information or
motivation is imputed to an impersonal organization, one approach sets upon
the perplexing physiological chore of locating the corporation's "mind."
Those who have set out to locate the corporation's mind have had little dif-
ficulty in finding it: "Thus we can call all those officers, whether elected or ap-
pointed, who direct, supervise and manage the corporation within its business
sphere and policy-wise, the 'inner circle.' They are the mens, the mind or brain,
of the corporation." ' 51 Those cases which focus upon the position in the cor-
porate hierarchy of the actor for purposes of determining whether the corpora-
tion possessed the appropriate state of mind adopt this view of the corporation.
The leading American case taking that position, People v. Canadian Fur Trappers
Corp., 5 2 has not been widely followed. However, as discussed below, the Model
Penal Code and states which have copied its provisions attempt to resurrect this
approach.
Most American courts, unwilling to limit corporate liability to situations
involving high management officials, seek ways of imputing the mens rea of a
broader group of employees to the corporation. In so doing these courts often
fail to make crucial distinctions relating to state of mind requirements in the
criminal law. In particular, they fail to distinguish between the requirement of
intent and the requirement of knowledge. The distinction may be largely
academic in the context of natural persons, since as an evidentiary matter,
awareness of the nature of one's conduct and its likely impact often implies the
intent to engage in the conduct and achieve its likely results. 53 However, as a
question of organizational law, the distinction is important.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
50 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
51 Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 21, 41 (1957). See also L. LEIGH, THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATION IN ENGLISH LAW 45, 91-112 (1969).
52 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455, 226 N.Y.S. 876 (1928).
53 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 202-03 (1972). For an extensive discussion of the im-
putation of criminal intent to the corporate entity, see S. Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extend-
ed to Its Limits, 38 FED. B.j. 49, 52-61 (1979).
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The law of agency has worked out an elaborate system to determine when
knowledge should be imputed to a principal. In general, the knowledge of an
agent who is acting in a manner which will bind his principal is imputed to the
principal.5 4 This results from the expectation that normally an agent will, or
should, communicate relevant information to his employer. However, where
that expectation is not justified because the agent is acting adversely to the
principal and entirely for his own or another person's purposes, generally
knowledge will not be imputed to the principal.5 5 The tests for imputation of
knowledge in some ways resemble, and are sometimes confused with, the tests
for whether an employee is acting on behalf of the employer at all.
Standard Oil Company of Texas v. United States 6 is an example of an adverse
agent case. Standard and its affiliate, Pasotex, were charged with violating the
Connally Hot Oil Act. The Act prohibited the interstate shipment of oil pro-
duced in excess of amounts permitted by state law. Criminal penalties were im-
posed for "knowingly" violating the Act. Employees of the defendants were
paid in cash or merchandise by Thompson, the owner of certain oil wells, to
falsify papers indicating the source of oil purchased and transported by the cor-
porate defendants. Some of the falsifications merely reallocated oil among dif-
ferent wells owned by Thompson. Others resulted in Standard purchasing oil
from Thompson that in fact it did not receive from the Thompson wells. In
reversing the conviction of Standard and Pasotex, the adverse interest of the
employees was critical to the court's refusal to impute knowledge to their prin-
cipals, the corporate defendants.
The adverse agent exception to the rule imputing knowledge to the prin-
cipal is limited. Except in unusual circumstances, 57 a principal may not deny
the knowledge of an adverse agent while retaining benefits from the agent's
act. Thus benefit to the corporation may be sufficient to impute knowledge to
the corporate defendant even where an agent is acting adversely.5 8
However, cases which have debated the question of benefit to the corpora-
tion have invariably been directed to a very different issue. "Benefit" has been
an issue because of claims that the violation was not in fact committed on
behalf of the corporation, that the agent was not in fact in the scope of his
employment. 59 For this reason, the court in Standard Oil was correct in
distinguishing Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 60 which was concerned with
whether the corporation's president was acting personally or on behalf of the
corporation in conspiring to violate price regulations. 61
Some substantive crimes require not merely knowledge, but willfulness or
intent on the part of the defendant. In such cases the question is one of the
defendant's conscious objective or desire. Determining organizational intent
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 55 272, 275, 283 (1958). But see id. § 273.
55 Id. § 279.
56 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
57 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(2)(c) (1958), where the principal has changed his
position.
58 Id. § 282.
59 Cf supra note 38, at 110-12 (the contrary interpretation of these cases in Elkins).
60 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
61 Numerous other cases raise the same issue of whether actions were on behalf of a corporation. See
United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1978).
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may pose different problems than determining organizational knowledge.
While in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the intent of the employee
within the scope of his employment may logically be imputed to the corpora-
tion, such corporate intent ought not to be found when a good faith company
policy conflicts with the suggested intent. 62 Where the policymaking body or a
high official of a corporation creates in good faith a group of procedures that
could reasonably be expected to implement a clearly articulated policy, and
these procedures are consistently carried out, it cannot reasonably be said that
the corporate entity consciously desires or intends the proscribed action or
result.
There are, of course, difficult problems of proof. An elaborate policy on
paper can be implemented ineffectively or in bad faith. 63 A strong directive can
be read to employees with a "wink of the eye." 64 Inaction can signal corporate
acceptance of contrary action. But proof problems ought not to disguise the
substantive issue of the availability of the defense.
Thus in Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 65 the corporation was acquitted
of willful violations of orders of the War Production Board because of consis-
tent corporate attempts to insure compliance with such orders. While commen-
tators often state that Holland Furnace has been rejected by the courts, 66 an ex-
amination of some of the relevant cases suggests that in those cases the cor-
porate policies against violation were not bona fide ones. 67 For example, in
United States v. Armour & Co., the court commented upon the widespread
disregard of corporate instructions, 68 suggesting that the policy was not ade-
quately enforced by the corporation.
C. The Attempts at Codification
There have been two major attempts to codify the rules relating to cor-
porate criminal liability-the Model Penal Code and proposed revisions of the
Federal Criminal Code. Each of the proposals perpetuates, to a greater or
lesser degree, existing analytical confusion. None of the proposals distinguish
between small and large corporations. 69 All of the proposals fail to make clear
distinctions between tests relating to whether persons are acting on behalf of
the corporation and those relating to imputation of mens rea to the corpora-
tion.
62 See generally Note, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Arts in Violation of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L. REv. 547
(1962); Elkins, supra note 38, at 119-21; Miller, supra note 53, at 61-68.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels, Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973). "Appellant could not gain exculpation by issuing general instructions without undertaking to
enforce those instructions by means commensurate with the obvious risks." Id. at 1007.
64 See D. VACTs, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 306-07 (2d ed. 1979); Miller, supra note 53, at 66.
65 158 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946). Compare, John Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir.),
modified, 206 F. 386 (1913).
66 See Note, supra note 62, at 556; Elkins, supra note 38, at 119-21.
67 See I WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 165
(1970) [hereinafter cited as I WORKING PAPERS].
68 168 F.2d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 1948).
69 The Staff Memorandum of the National Commission of Reform of Federal Criminal Laws states in
part: "In all cases in which ownership and operation are divided, and the operation is performed by
managers and employees who are not identical with the owners, the problems with respect to where to place
responsibility are the same." I WORKING'PAPERS, supra note 67, at 182 n.58.
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The Criminal Code Reform Bill of 197870 most nearly codifies the current
judicially developed doctrines. Section 402 provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, an organization is criminally liable for
an offense if conduct constituting the offense:
(a) is conduct of the agent, and such conduct:
(1) occurs in the performance of matters within the scope of the
agent's employment, or within the scope of the agent's
actual, implied, or apparent authority, and is intended to
benefit the organization; or
(2) is thereafter ratified or adopted by the organization; or
(b) involves a failure by the organization or its agent to discharge a
specific duty-of conduct imposed on the organization by law.
This formulation creates confusion in several respects. It requires an
agent's action to be both in the scope of employment and intended to benefit the
corporation. The Committee Report accompanying the bill explains this by
reference to the case of Old Monastery Co. v. United States,7' and states:
In general, the principle that may be distilled from the cases is that the
organization will be held criminally liable if it was the intended beneficiary of
the act, even though the act was misguided and the organization does not
benefit therefrom 2
Old Monastery, however, was concerned with whether acts of the corporation's
president were carried out on behalf of the corporation. In response to the con-
tention that the corporation did not benefit from the acts, the court stated that
"benefit, at best, is an evidential, not an operative fact."17 3 Section 402 has
made it an operative fact.
Intent to benefit the corporation is important as an operative fact on the
issue of whether an agent's knowledge is to be imputed to the corporation.
Where mens rea is necessary, an agent acting in the scope of employment but
without intent to benefit the corporation should not have his knowledge im-
puted to the corporation. Section 402(a), however, fails to distinguish between
issues of agency and issues of corporate intent.
Similar confusion is evidenced by the provisions of section 402(b). It is
unclear when a person not in the scope of his employment would nevertheless
be covered by section 402(b) in cases involving affirmative acts. While the sec-
tion might be seen as applying only to cases of nonfeasance, this interpretation
70 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. S 111 (1979). See Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1247-51. S.
1437 passed in the Senate but failed to pass in the House during the 95th Congress. A modified version has
been introduced in the 96th Congress as S. 1722 and S. 1723 (96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979). Section 402 of S.
1722 is identical to § 402 of the earlier S. 1437.
71 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
72 SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-605
(Pt. 1), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1977).
73 147 F.2d. at 908.
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is problematic. Section 111 defines "conduct," a term used in section 402(a),
as including "any omission." In addition, the Senate Report on section 402(b)
indicates that the provision may apply to failure to discharge a duty "to refrain
from taking certain action, as well as to act affirmatively." 74 Alternatively, sec-
tion 402(b) might be seen as applying to affirmative acts which constitute of-
fenses even when no mens rea is present. However, the Senate Report states,
"Often, but not always, such a duty will be associated with a statute imposing
strict criminal liability." ' 75  Three examples are given in the Senate
Report 76 -violations of food and drug laws,7 7 violations of price control regula-
tions,7 8 and compliance with safety regulations in connection with highly
dangerous work.79 Armour & Co., the price control case cited, involved a viola-
tion requiring willfulness. Section 402(b) might be seen as imposing corporate
liability in such a case even if the corporate agent did not have mens rea.
However, this seems inconsistent with section 404(b) which bars prosecution of
the corporation where all its responsible agents have been acquitted because of
insufficient evidence not occasioned by a suppression order.
Both the Model Penal Code80 and early versions of proposals for Federal
Criminal Code reform restrict corporate criminal liability more severely than
do most current judicially developed rules. In result, these provisions resemble
the position that views high management as the corporation's "mind" for pur-
poses of formulating criminal intent. However, the motivation for such provi-
sions is in part very different. It turns upon an assessment of the effectiveness of
sanctions against the corporation as a deterrent. Anthropomorphization was
specifically rejected by drafters of the Federal Criminal Code proposals:
[A] corporation is nothing more than a "convenient legal device." . . . It is
possible to "personify" the corporate entity in order to "rationalize" the ap-
plication to it of the criminal law, but to do so does not give it the capability of
acting or of being deterred or coerced which it lacks in fact. Many arguments
have been advanced in support of the corporate fine but they neither depend
upon nor require acceptance of the fiction that a corporation is capable of
acting. There would appear to be no substantial reason for perpetuating the
fiction and allowing it to find its way into a new Federal Criminal Code. 81
By accepting the possibility of imputing mens rea to the corporate entity,
but focusing upon the efficacy of sanctions, an anomalous result is reached.
The corporate entity is least criminally responsible for the most serious offenses
committed on its behalf. An examination of the complex structure of the provi-
sions of the Model Penal Code and the proposed new Federal Criminal Code
74 Supra note 72, at 78 n.81.
75 Id. at 78 n.80 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 78 n.81.
77 Citing United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
851 (1948).
78 Citing United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948).
79 Citing Thorne v. United States, 479 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1973).
80 See Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1251-53. The Model Penal Code approach has been
adopted in whole or part by some states, see e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 20.20 (McKinney 1975); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 7.22 (Vernon 1974).
81 I WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 67, at 184-85. The Staff Report imputes an anthropomorphic model to
the drafter of the Model Penal Code. Id. at 185 n.67. As is suggested in the text, see text accompanying note
98 infra, elements of this do appear in the Model Penal Code.
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as finally reported by the National Commission on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws illustrates the approach. Both codifications impose criminal
liability on the corporation for offenses which require no mens rea whenever
committed by an agent acting within the scope of his employment. 82 The
Model Penal Code, however, complicates the issue because offenses involving
absolute liability are treated as part of a larger group of offenses as to which "a
legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears.' '83 For
all offenses in that latter category, the Code requires that a person's conduct be
"in behalf of the corporation" as well as "in the scope of his office employ-
ment." This requirement that the corporation receive a benefit is explained as
a way "to avoid the problem presented in Moore v. Bressler Ltd. [1944] 2 A.E.R.
515, in which the corporation was held liable for criminal conduct committed
by officers within the scope of their duties but for the purpose of concealing a
fraud perpetrated by the same officers against the corporation.' '84 Moore,
however, was a case in which criminal intent was required in order to violate
the relevant tax law. The court there incorrectly imputed to the corporation the
mens rea of an adverse agent. Had no mens rea been required, if the actions
were in fact in the scope of employment, corporate liability would have been
appropriate.
Both codifications impose criminal liability on corporations for omissions to
discharge specific duties imposed by law. 85 This is the thrust in part of section
402(b) discussed above. The provision as it relates to omissions is explained by
the drafters of the federal proposals as follows: "Paragraph (b) is the easy case:
where a duty to act is expressly imposed on the corporation, no inquiry into its
internal distribution of responsibility is called for." 86 The result is, of course,
correct as to any question of whether the omission was on behalf of the corpora-
tion. The added question of when mens rea is to be imputed to the corporation
in omission cases remains unanswered. Where an omission is criminal only if
accompanied by knowledge or intent, as suggested above for affirmative acts, it
is questionable whether a corporation should be liable if none of its agents
possessed the requisite state of mind.
87
When the issue is corporate liability for other offenses, an additional
distinction is made by these codifications based upon the seriousness of the of-
fense. In both codes, minor offenses committed by any agent in the scope of
employment are chargeable to the corporation. The proposed Federal Code ap-
plies this rule to any misdemeanor.8 8 The Model Penal Code applies it to any
"violation,'189 a category that is defined as a noncriminal infraction of law. 90
82 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS § 402(1)(d) (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT];
MODEL PENAL CODE 55 2.07(1)(a), 2.07(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Section 2.07(2) creates a presump-
tion that absolute liability provisions come within this description of offenses.
84 MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.07, Comment at 147 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
85 FINAL REPORT, supra note 82, at § 402(1)(b); MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.07(1)(b) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
86 I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 67, at 164.
87 But compare FINAL REPORT, supra note 82, at S 402(2).
88 FINAL REPORT, supra note 82, at § 402(1)(c).
89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
90 "Violation" is defined in id.S 1.04(5).
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The rationale here is a complex one. Corporate liability for minor offenses
seems based upon the judgment that, in this area, limiting prosecutions to in-
dividual agents would not sufficiently deter the prohibited conduct. The
drafters of the Model Penal Code suggest:
[T]here are probably cases in which the economic pressures within the cor-
porate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal
liability for the sake of company gain, especially where the penalties threat-
ened are moderate and where the offense does not involve behavior con-
demned as highly immoral by the individual's associates. This tendency may
be particularly strong where the individual knows that his guilt may be dif-
ficult to prove or where a favorable reaction to his position by a jury may be
anticipated even where proof of guilt is strong. 91
For more serious offenses, the drafters of these codifications began with
the notion that direct sanctions placed upon the guilty individual actors would
deter illegal conduct. In their view extending liability to the corporate entity
creates two negative effects, sometimes without achieving greater deterrence.
First, it creates the possibility that prosecutors or juries will use corporate
liability as an excuse to fail to prosecute or to acquit guilty individuals. 92
Second, the sanction imposed upon the corporate entity, a monetary fine,
ultimately impacts shareholders who were personally innocent of criminal con-
duct. 93
On the other hand, several reasons are identified as remaining to impose
corporate liability for serious corporate crime by the drafters of these codes.
First, in some cases, the threat of adverse publicity for the corporation may be
the most effective deterrent. This is especially true where the corporation is
heavily dependent upon public trust and confidence in its products, services, or
management. 94 Second, corporate fines are a method of preventing unjust
enrichment of the corporation. 95 Alternative methods are, however, available
for this purpose. 96 Finally, at levels of high management, shareholders may be
able to bring pressure to bear to prevent illegal corporate activity. 97
These considerations have led the drafters of these codes to limit corporate
liability to situations involving high corporate management. The rationale for
drawing the line at this point, as articulated by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code, seems to involve an anthropomorphic model in order to assess moral
responsibility:
[C]orporate liability is confined to situations in which the criminal conduct is
performed or participated in by the board of directors or by corporate officers
91 MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.07, Comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). For similar statements in
connection with the Federal Criminal Code proposals, see I WORKINO PAPERS, supra note 67, at 190, 200-01.
92 MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.07, Comment at 149-50 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); I WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 67, at 163, 165, 190, 197.
93 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); I WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 67, at 163, 184, 189.
94 I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 67, at 164, 166, 191-92, 197. See also Elkins, supra note 38, at 77-85.
95 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Commefit at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); I WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 67, at 196.
96 See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 67, at 197-98, 203-06.
97 MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.07, Comment at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Compare I WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 67, at 189-90.
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and agents sufficiently high in the hierarchy to make it reasonable to assume
that their acts are in some substantial sense reflective of the policy of the cor-
porate body.98
Thus, if management is not the corporation's "mind," it is at least its con-
science.
The formulations of provisions relating to participation by high manage-
ment officials differ. The Model Penal Code applies its provisions to offenses
"authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated" by
management. 99 The Federal Criminal Code proposal contains alternative
language. The minority alternative is similar to that of the Model Penal Code,
and adds conduct "ratified" by management to the coverage. The majority
draft excludes liability for conduct "recklessly tolerated" by management, and
imposes liability only for conduct "authorized, requested, or commanded" by
management.10 0 In addition, the two codifications differ in their definitions of
high management officials.' 0'
As discussed above, actions by agents in contravention of a bona fide, en-
forced corporate policy ought to negate an imputation of willfulness to the cor-
poration. The Model Penal Code has provided a defense in certain cases "if
the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial
agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense
employed due diligence to prevent its commission." 10 2 This defense applies on-
ly to commissions of noncriminal "violations," and to offenses as to which "a
legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears" if such
offense is not one as to which absolute liability had been imposed. Since under
the Model Penal Code other offenses requiring mens rea are not chargeable to
the corporation absent involvement of high management officials, this defense
need not be broader.10 3
It is particularly interesting to note that all attempts to codify the prin-
ciples of corporate criminal liability exclude municipal corporations from their
coverage.'0 4 The Model Penal Code drafters state merely that "corporate
liability is generally pointless in such cases.105 The drafters of the Federal pro-
98 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
99 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
100 FINAL REPORT, supra note 82, at § 402(1)(a).
101 The Model Penal Code includes the board of directors and officers or agents having duties of such
responsibility that their actions may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation. MODEL
PENAL CODE 55 2.07(1)(c), 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The Federal proposal covers conduct of directors, executive officers or other agents in positions of com-
parable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or supervision in a managerial capacity
of subordinate employees, and any other person who controls the corporation or is responsibly involved in
forming its policy. FINAL REPORT, supra note 82, at § 402(1)(a).
Both codifications also impose corporate liability where a statute specifies it on account of the conduct
of other persons. Id. at § 402(1)(a)(iv); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
102 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
103 The Staff Memorandum on the Federal Criminal Code proposals suggested inserting two defenses:
"exceptional occurrence without fault in supervision or management" and a defense that "the responsible
individuals acted contrary to corporate policy and are convicted." I WORKINO PAPERS, supra note 67, at 165.
See also Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1257-58.
104 See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 111 (1979) (definition of "organization"); FINAL REPORT, supra
note 82, at § 409(1)(a), but see Comment to § 409(1)(a), at 36; see also MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07(4)(a) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962).
105 Model Penal Code § 2.07, Status of Section at 38 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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posal describe their reasons at greater length, but with little more clarity. "The
problems of diffusion of responsibility are not unlike those in the commercial
corporate world.... On the other hand, public agencies are generally subject
to closer scrutiny than are private corporations, so that the publicity sanctions
of section 405(1)(a) might be less needful." 1 , 06 This comment may instinctively
recognize the difference in internal checks in the municipal and business cor-
poration, discussed above.
IV. The Corporation and The Bill of Rights
A. An Overview of the Problem
A critical component of American criminal jurisprudence has been the
federal constitutional protections granted to criminal defendants. The extent to
which these protections ought to apply to corporate criminal defendants has not
been well thought out. Again the anthropomorphization of the corporation is in
part responsible for obscuring well-reasoned analysis.
The application of the bill of rights provisions and the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution to corporations has been ineluctably shaped by the
state action-private action dichotomy which pervades this area of the law.
Business corporations are not, by the fact of incorporation, state instrumen-
talities limited by the fourteenth amendment. 10 7 They are conversely, as
"private" actors, shielded from arbitrary governmental power by the Bill of
Rights and fourteenth amendment. This simplistic pigeonholing has obscured
a number of more complex questions.
The early concerns of business corporations were often ones of economic
discrimination. Inspired by Charles and Mary Beard,t0 8 many historians iden-
tify the corporate victory on this issue in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad 9 as the decisive turning point in the protection of corporate rights. 110
If that were so, there would be ample justification for puzzlement over Chief
Justice Waite's statement in Santa Clara County that the Court did not wish to
hear argument on the applicability of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to corporations since the justices were unanimous in agree-
ing that it applied. "' However, this unanimity of opinion is not puzzling when
it is recognized that the Supreme Court had taken the crucial step sixty-seven
years earlier in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 112 The critical deter-
mination as to corporate rights was made at this earlier time through the sever-
106 I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 67, at 165-66. Section 405(1)(a), referred to in the excerpt, permits the
court to impose as a sanction the requirement that the organization give appropriate publicity to the convic-
tions. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEw FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CODE 32 (1970).
107 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
108 2 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111-14 (1927).
109 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
110 See Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Miller,
Toward "Constitutionalizing" the Corporation: A Speculative Essay, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 190-93 (1978).
111 118 U.S. at 396.
112 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819). For other recognition of the importance of the decision in this regard,
see Newmyer, JusticeJoseph Story's Doctrine of "Public and Private Corporation" and the Rise ofthe American Business
Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 825 (1976).
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ing of the doctrinal links between the business corporation and the municipal
corporation.
The corporation became the object of constitutional protection when its
political nature was suppressed. ChiefJustice Marshall, in the Dartmouth College
case, undertook that suppression:
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, ... the subject is one
in which the legislature of the state may act according to its own judgment,
unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the constitution of the
United States.
... But this being does not share in the civil government of the country,
unless that be the purpose for which it was created .... It is no more a state
instrument, than a natural person exercising the same powers would be.
113
Thus Marshall transformed the basic legal framework governing business cor-
porations.1 14
In Dartmouth College, Marshall not only created a new path for the
nongovernmental corporation by emphasizing its non-political nature, but he
also personified it by obscuring its organizational aspects. In concluding his
opinion, he wrote:
[T]he court has confined itself to the rights possessed by the trustees, as the
assignees and representatives of the donors and founders .... Yet, it is not
clear that the trustees ought to be considered as destitute of such beneficial in-
terest in themselves, as the law may respect .... But the court has deemed it
unnecessary to investigate this particular point, being of opinion, on general
principles, that in these private eleemosynary institutions, the body corporate...
has rights which are protected by the constitution. 115
The concept of the business corporation as an institution governed by
principles different from the municipal corporation rapidly became accepted.
By 1831, the need for a treatise dealing separately with the business corpora-
tion led to the publication by Angell and Ames of Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporations Aggregate. 116 However, it is not clear that this legal separation has
led to a more effective legal system for the governance of business corporations.
In the case of municipal corporations, the law has been able to deal with
both their rights and their obligations. While subjecting the political power of
municipalities to constraints of the fourteenth amendment, at the same time
the courts have developed doctrines to prevent some types of economic
discrimination against municipalities. The courts have thus held that
municipalities, as state entities, may not be subjected to discriminatory federal
113 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30, 636.
114 For the impact ofJustice Story's Dartmouth College concurrence on this, see Newmyer, supra note 112.
115 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 653-54 (emphasis added).
116 J. ANGELL & S. AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE (Ist ed. 1831).
The Preface to the First Edition of Angell and Ames specifically identifies this need as the reason for their
treatise.
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taxation."t 7 While the protection is similar to that granted to business corpora-
tions as to state taxes under the equal protection clause, the doctrine as to
municipalities has developed as a principle of intergovernmental relations. The
flexibility to pick and choose, to protect against arbitrary economic depriva-
tions when policies specifically applicable to the corporation suggest the
wisdom of the course, but to avoid cluttering corporate legal doctrine with prin-
ciples designed for the particular interests of individual natural persons, was
soon lost as to business corporations. Instead the business corporation was
forced into awkward categories of personal constitutional jurisprudence.
While the corporation as "person" admirably served to protect against
discriminatory taxation within a state, its status as "person" did not always
provide other kinds of economic protection. Fear of out-of-state domination of
a state's economy was seen in 1868 as sufficient to permit discriminatory
licensing provisions to be applied to foreign corporations. Although corpora-
tions may be "persons," they need not be called "citizens," so the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution was of no
avail. 118
This epithetical jurisprudence became the basis upon which the courts
were to encounter the question of the applicability of the Bill of Rights provi-
sions to corporate defendants in criminal cases. Was the corporation as a "per-
son" fully protected by the Bill of Rights? It became clear that the corporation
would not be fully analogized to the natural person as the Supreme Court held
in the early part of the twentieth century that the liberty right guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment "is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons." 119
That formulation, however, was of little assistance, for it was enunciated in
cases in which the corporations seemed clearly concerned with vindicating
economic, i.e., property, rights. Thus, even in Western Turf Association v.
Greenberg which appears initially to be a corporate assertion of the right to
privacy and association, economic considerations were predominant. The cor-
poration asserted the right to exclude a patron from its race track because the
individual was publishing a racing form in violation of the exclusive right
granted by the corporation to a different publisher. 120
The physical inability to imprison a corporation is, of course, the most ob-
vious example in which the individual has a different kind of liberty interest
than does the corporation. Corporations have no occasion to assert those pro-
tections, such as the eighth amendment bail provisions, which apply solely to
the incarceration of individuals. Beyond this, however, the question of what
Bill of Rights provisions ought to apply to the corporation becomes more com-
plex. Two major areas can be identified in which the large publicly held cor-
poration may be distinguished from the individual for purposes of constitional
protection. One relates to the absence historically of corporate rights to privacy
and to those aspects of personal autonomy which have been subsumed under
117 For the basic doctrine, see Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978); New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). As to municipalities specifically, seeWilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S.
411 (1949).
118 Paul v. Virginia, 76 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178-82 (1868).
119 Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs,
203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
120 204 U.S. at 360. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906), involved a freedom of
contract assertion.
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that rubric. Second, the vast disparity in power, influence and resources be-
tween the government and the criminal defendant which are a basis of a
number of Bill of Rights provisions is less pronounced in the large corporate
context. It is essentially these differences which the courts have been called
upon to consider in determining the applicability of Bill of Rights provisions to
corporations.
B. The Irrelevance of the First Amendment Cases-A Digression
In writing for the Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
Justice Powell considered as relevant to the question of the corporate first
amendment right to speak on public issues the determination that certain Bill
of Rights provisions other than the first amendment had been applied to cor-
porations. 1 21 However, the special nature of the doctrines developed under the
first amendment makes the corporate and commercial speech cases largely in-
appropriate precedent in dealing with rights of corporations as criminal defen-
dants. Again, in order to clarify the appropriate issues, irrelevant approaches
must be discarded.
Three kinds of cases raise the issue of the applicability of the first amend-
ment to corporations. First are cases involving the professional press. In such
cases, the power and resources of large corporations are a crucial factor, and to
that extent the considerations have relevance to the problems of corporate
criminal defendants. However, in these press cases, the courts are essentially
being asked to choose between two legal models in a context peculiar to the first
amendment. One model is that of the established press as part of the dominant
political-business structure which should be restrained by government in order
to protect the voices of the small, dissenting speaker. The competing model is
that of the press not as an ally, but as an adversary, of the established political
order. This model requires a large and powerful press, totally free from
governmental control, in order to preserve effective checks on large and power-
ful government. It was the latter model for which the Supreme Court opted in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo1 22 in striking down a state statute requir-
ing newspapers to furnish political candidates a free right of reply in some cir-
cumstances. 123
The second kind of corporate speech case involves corporations (other
than the professional press) speaking out on political issues or issues of general
public concern. Here corporate speech is chosen, generally, because federal tax
laws make it more costly to distribute corporate profits to shareholders for the
purpose of shareholders engaging in the relevant communication. The expen-
diture may be a tax deductible business expense for the corporation, but not for
the shareholder. In any event, distributions to shareholders are subject to in-
come tax at the shareholder level as well as the corporate level. In First National
121 435 U.S. 765, 778-79 n.14 (1978).
122 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
123 A different result obtains as to the electronic media because of the peculiar limitation of airwave
channels in that medium. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 124 the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the
first amendment to such corporate speech on public issues.
Finally, a group of cases deal with purely commercial speech-the
dissemination by corporations and by noncorporate businesses of truthful fac-
tual information relating to proposed business transactions. 125 Here the ap-
plication of the first amendment to protect truthful advertising turns on the role
of information in the functioning of a free-market economic system. 126
The rationales underlying these lines of cases are far removed from the
considerations relevant to protecting rights of corporate criminal defendants.
Any attempt to equate application of first amendment guarantees to corpora-
tions with application of other Bill of Rights provisions to them ignores basic
underlying differences in the cases.
C. Privacy-Based Protections and the Corporation
Various guarantees of the Bill of Rights are based upon the protection of
personal privacy. Justice Douglas has described this notion:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy .... The Fourth Amendment ex-
plicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender.1 27
The corporation has historically never been viewed as possessing any com-
parable privacy right. It is well accepted that affairs of municipal corporations
are treated as matters of public interest. Municipal records are generally
available for public inspection. 12 The same principle is reflected for the
business corporation in the traditional visitorial jurisdiction of the courts.
General governmental power to look into the affairs of a corporation has been
assumed. 2 9 The Supreme Court has accepted this lack of privacy interests in
the corporation as basic in interpreting the bill of rights. In rejecting a claim of
unreasonable search and seizure and denial of due process of law, the Court
held:
[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy .... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a
collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting
as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with
them an enhanced measure of regulation .... Even if one were to regard the
request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official
curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
124 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
125 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15 (1978).
126 See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976).
127 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
128 See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 701-12 (1979).
129 See Pound, VisitorialJurisdiction Over Corporations in Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1936).
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themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public in-
terest.
13 0
It is on this basis that corporations have been denied the privilege against
self-incrimination. In Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme Court emphasized that crea-
tion by the state and special privileges and benefits granted to corporations give
the state the right to investigate the corporation: "While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions . . , it does not follow that a
corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show
its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges." 3 1 The Court went on
to hold that the federal government has comparable power over state corpora-
tions in connection with questions of interstate commerce.
13 2
A similar rationale, linking the denial of the privilege to the historical
visitorial power over corporations, as well, was articulated several years later
by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. United States:
Although the object of the inquiry may be to detect the abuses it has commit-
ted, to discover its violations of law and to inflict punishment by forfeiture of
franchises or otherwise, it must submit its books and papers to duly con-
stituted authority when demand is suitably made. This is involved in the reser-
vation of the visitorial power of the State, and in the authority of the National
Government where the corporate activities are in the domain subject to the
powers of Congress.
33
Athough often analyzed as a separate problem, it would seem that the
absence of a corporate interest in privacy should also affect the applicability of
the fourth amendment search and seizure provisions in the case of large public-
ly held corporations. The courts have not adequately discussed the interrela-
tionship of the fourth amendment provisions in the corporate context with the
general denial of privacy protections to corporations. Iconoclastic elimination
of pigeonholing between fourth and fifth amendment cases, and between kinds
of fourth amendment cases, is necessary to create a consistent notion of con-
stitutional rights of corporations.
Initially, insofar as the fourth amendment generally prohibits the seizure
of items testimonial in nature that could not be directly obtained from a defen-
dant because of fifth amendment protections, 134 in the case of corporations no
bar should be present. 35 Since the corporation lacks a fifth amendment
privilege, no distinctions should be made between testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence belonging to the corporation. Whatever the rule as to the
seizure of an individual's incriminating diary, no comparable problem exists in
the seizure of a corporation's incriminating minute books.' 36
130 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); quoted with approval in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-66 (1974). See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 260-71 (1964)
(Appendix I to Opinion of Douglas, J.).
131 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906).
132 Id.
133 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
134 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
135 See Note, The Applicability ofthe DoubleJeopardy Right to Corporations, 1977 DUKE L.J. 726, 740 n.80. Cf
Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1276-89 (suggesting that business documents are never privileged).
136 See 1 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 2.6 (1978).
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But the absence of corporate privacy interests casts a longer shadow on the
application of the fourth amendment to corporations. In applying the fourth
amendment to corporations, the courts have failed to deal carefully with
underlying rationales. A more particularized examination will disclose the
necessity of making distinctions which the courts have often ignored.
Some cases applying the fourth amendment to corporations involve small
closely held businesses which are the alter ego of their owners, and which share
the privacy interests of these owners. Thus in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 137 the corporation had no employees and apparently was doing no
business. The Supreme Court described it as the "alter ego" of its owner "and
a repository of at least some of his personal assets." 1 3 8 In such cases, it is ap-
propriate to apply to such closely held corporations the same protections
available to its individual principals.
For the large publicly held corporation, however, different considerations
apply. Were the only interest protected by the fourth amendment the interest
in privacy, the precedents discussed above ought to make the fourth amend-
ment inapplicable. But the Supreme Court has recognized that the fourth
amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all." 1 39 One of these other protections is that of the business corpora-
tion's property interest in the smooth and continued functioning of its commer-
cial operations. Unreasonable intrusions interfere with the day-to-day conduct
of business. 140 In Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 14 t the
Supreme Court identified the relevant concerns as the "interruption of
business, the possible revelation of trade secrets, and the expense that com-
pliance with the Commission's wholesale demand would cause.' ' 42
It is this business interest which should be viewed as the basis of the
Supreme Court's holdings relating to the appropriate scope of corporate
searches and to limitations upon the scope of demands for corporate informa-
tion. Fourth amendment jurisprudence need not depart from the general no-
tion that corporations have no legitimate expectations of privacy, in the sense
of nondisclosure of information. Rather, it is the fourth amendment's protec-
tion of valuable business operations-a protection probably also implicit in the
due process guarantee-which leads to the holding that "when an ad-
ministrative agency subpoenas corporate books and records, the fourth amend-
ment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in
purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably
burdensome.' ' 43 Similarly, it would seem to be this concept that has led the
Supreme Court to find that although a corporate employer has no reasonable
expectation of privacy (i.e., nondisclosure) as to matters which employees
observe in their daily functions, nevertheless a government inspector has no
137 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
138 Id. at 343.
139 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (footnote omitted).
140 See 2 W.R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.13, especially at 208 (1978).
141 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
142 Id. at 306.
143 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (footnote omitted).
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right to enter premises from which the general public is excluded in order to
discover the same things.144
D. Power-Based Protections and the Corporation
The disparity between the vast power of government and the assumed
powerlessness of criminal defendants is the basis for certain of the Bill of Rights
protections. Special constraints are necessary to check governmental ar-
bitrariness, repression and overzealousness. Especially when the stigma of
criminality is involved and when loss of liberty as well as property is at stake,
procedural and structural scrupulousness is mandated. In the case of the large
publicly held corporation, it is clear that the disparity in power and resources
between government and defendant is diminished. Certainly that is true, for
example, when one compares the state of Delaware with many of its publicly
held corporate creations. 145 Even at the federal level, however, disparity be-
tween the power of large multinational corporations and federal governmental
power is diminished from the norm envisioned by drafters of the special
criminal law protections of the Bill of Rights.
The most obvious distinction between the corporation and the individual
is the inability to imprison the corporation. Therefore, the potential impact of
governmental sanctions is reduced. Even as to fines, the large publicly held
corporation is usually less threatened by government. Generally being
wealthier than the individual defendant, the impact of fines, limited in amount
by statute, is less severe on corporations. 1 46 The large corporation's access to
investigative and legal personnel lessens the government's advantage in
resources. Finally, the large corporation's ability to influence public opinion
through advertising and public relations efforts reduces the potential stigmatiz-
ing impact of conviction on the corporation. 47 These considerations become
particularly relevant in considering the applicability to the corporation of the
fifth amendment's double jeopardy provisions and the sixth amendment's
criminal jury trial provisions.
The Supreme Court has on at least two occasions in recent years applied
the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment to protect corporations,
without discussing the questions raised by that application. 48 Several lower
courts have specifically addressed the question and have, likewise, concluded
144 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978).
145 See, e.g., J. PHELAN & R. POZEN, THE COMPANY STATE (1973).
146 Cf. Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2201(c) (1978) (permitting alter-
native fine not exceeding twice the gain derived or twice the loss caused).
147 CompareJ.K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLC PURPOSE 134-45 (1973); but see Elkins, supra
note 38, at 77-80.
148 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), Foo Fong v. United States, 369
U.S. 141 (1962). It is interesting to note that Justice Powell's opinion for the court in First Natl Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, as it appeared in slip opinion, cited Martin Linen Supply as standing for the proposition that
the double jeopardy provision applies to corporations, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1417 n.14 (1978). In the official ver-
sion of the same opinion appearing in United States Reports, the citation to Martin Linen Supply disappeared,
435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14 (1978). In other cases, the Supreme Court has considered and rejected on the merits
corporate claims of doublejeopardy without discussion of the threshold question, Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), and has as-
sumed its applicability in other contexts, Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
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that the provision applies to corporations.1 49 Rationalizing the question of the
applicability of double jeopardy provisions to corporations is difficult in part
because of the confused state of the general law of double jeopardy.150
One of the major policies underlying the double jeopardy provision is the
prohibition of double punishment.15 1 If this fifth amendment protection were
not available, often the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel would
operate to achieve a similar limitation on double punishment of
corporations. 152 However, even the full application of the double jeopardy doc-
trine has not prevented the imposition of one type of double sanction-the civil
penalty followed or preceded by a criminal fine for the same activity. 153 For the
corporate defendant, a civil penalty followed by a criminal fine appears to be
double punishment in anything but a Pickwickian sense. However, in many
cases the courts have found no double jeopardy violation. i5 4 The civil penalty-
criminal fine combination is not a uniquely corporate problem. However, the
combination in regulatory and tax statutes often impacts the corporation.
Because of the inability to imprison the corporation, the potential sanctions ap-
pear more nearly duplicative. The courts have focused primarily on questions
of legislative intent to punish as determinative of whether a "civil" penalty is
in fact criminal and therefore triggers the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment. 155
That this civil penalty-criminal fine combination continues to be accepted
suggests that current levels of criminal fines, at least for large corporations, are
significantly lower than appropriate. By itself, multiple punishment hardly
shocks the conscience if the cumulative level is appropriate. This is particularly
true where the punishments consist of two smaller monetary exactions, rather
than one larger fine. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the
"ordeal" of two trials, merely the writing of two corporate checks rather than
one seems hardly to rise to the level of constitutional significance. Hence the
technicality of the civil-criminal distinction is used to avoid the technical ap-
plication of double jeopardy concepts when the limitations so imposed would
prevent the accomplishment of appropriate levels of punishment and deter-
rence.
A second type of double jeopardy issue arises in the context of attempts to
reprosecute after a mistrial.156 The policies which come into play in this kind of
case pose the most difficult issues as to corporate rights, for it is here that
assumptions relating to disparities in power and resources between the state
149 United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977); United States v. Southern Ry.
485 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 252 F.Supp. 364 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
150 See Westen & Drubel, TowardA General Theory ofDoubleJeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81; The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1, 108-20 (1978); Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1342-50.
151 Westen & Drubel, supra note 150, at 106-22.
152 See Note, Double Jeopardy and Corporations: "Lurking In the Record" and "Ripe for Decision, " 28 STAN. L.
REv. 805, 812-14 (1976).
153 See Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 478 (1974); Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1300-51, Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976).
154 See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 634 (1955).
155 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938).
156 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 150, at 85-106.
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and the defendant are most critical. Justice Black's statement in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Green v. United States has been seen as the starting point
analysis in this type of case: 157
The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecuri-
ty as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.158
For the individual, two separate kinds of ordeals are identified-a
material expenditure of money and effort, and a. psychological pressure
creating anxiety, insecurity and embarrassment. For the large publicly held
corporation, these considerations merge. There is no separate psychological
pressure, 159 but merely the insecurity that the corporate entity may suffer a
monetary fine or a loss of value because of damage to its corporate image. 160
The size of resources available to the large corporation may reduce the ordeal-
like nature of this economic risk. 161
A review of the cases which have discussed the issue indicates that courts
have not adverted to many of the relevant distinctions relating to corporate
defendants. The failure to distinguish large publicly held corporations from
closely held companies in which the individual owners are in fact personally af-
fected by corporate prosecutions is one problem evidenced by the cases.1 62
Beyond this, courts suggest that even in the large corporation, individual
shareholders are affected. 163 This analysis, however, ignores the distance
between shareholders and their publicly held companies.1 64 Certainly the
shareholder will not feel psychologically attacked merely because a large com-
pany, some of whose stock he owns, is being tried. Finally, courts focus upon
the impact of prosecutions upon corporate image and good will.1 65 There is lit-
tle question that such economic impact exists, although perhaps it may be
reduced by prudent corporate image promotion. The importance of this
economic good-will impairment to the general doctrine of double jeopardy re-
quires further clarification by the courts.
157 This is so even though Green was a case involving acquittal rather than mistrial, see Westen & Drubel,
supra note 150, at 86.
158 355TU.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
159 See Note, supra note 152, at 825-27.
160 Justice Powell, joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, wrote in his dissent in Crist v.
Bretz: ". . . the central concern of the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be regarded solely as protecting
against repeated expenditures of the defendant's efforts and resources." This conclusion was based upon the
fact that significant efforts and expenditures are often required in pre-trial proceedings before jeopardy at-
taches. 437 U.S. 28, 50 (1978).
161 But cf. Note, supra note 135, at 743 (suggesting the inappropriateness of a case-by-case inquiry into
the degree of harassment involved).
162 See United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
950 (1977).
163 Id. at 494; United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 252 F.Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
164 Note, supra note 152, at 823-24. See also Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessar.y?, 29
Sw. L. REV. 908, 920-21 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
165 United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d at 335; United States v. Security Nat'l Bank,
546 F.2d at 494-95. See also Note, supra note 135, at 747-48.
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A third type of double jeopardy case involves appeal by the government
and attempted reprosecution after acquittal where legal error has occurred at
the first trial. In addition to the policies involved in the mistrial situation, here
an additional policy is involved. This may be described as protection of the
power of the jury or other fact finder in the first trial to express the consensus of
the community by ignoring the evidence or the appropriate rules of law, and to
acquit the defendant. 1 66 If this was the basis of an initial acquittal, the presence
of legal error should be irrelevant. The defendant is "entitled" to the "er-
roneous" acquittal. Preserving this right to "nullification" may be particularly
appropriate in the case of corporate criminal defendants. Since juries at least
are not likely to have empathy as a peer with the corporate entity, an acquittal
based upon jury nullification will express a stronger than usual sense of the
community. It will be in the face of a likely antagonism to, or at least of no par-
ticular personal sympathy for, the defendant.
The application of the sixth amendment's jury trial provisions to corpora-
tions also poses special problems. The role of the petit criminal jury has been
described by the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana:1 67
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent op-
pression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too respon-
sive to the voice of higher authority .... Providing an accused with the right
to be tried by his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the
more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was
to have it. 16
This concern with governmental power thus suggests that where the power
disparity is reduced, less reason for ajury trial exists. However, as discussed in
the context of the double jeopardy provisions, the structural bias against jury
nullification in the case of the corporate defendant-the unlikelihood that a
jury of individuals will be more sympathetic than ajudge-suggests that when
the corporate defendant desires a jury trial a real potential of governmental
abuse of power exists.
The courts have in fact been presented with the issue of corporate jury trial
rights in a slightly different context. In Duncan, the Supreme Court went on to
emphasize an additional reason for jury trial guarantees. They reflect "a reluc-
tance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one
judge or a group of judges."' 1 6 9 The emphasis upon jury trial as a protection
against arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty raises questions about the ap-
plicability of the right where the only available sanction is a monetary fine.
Duncan was ambiguous on the issue. It referred to jury trial rights attaching
when "the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punish-
166 See Westen & Drubel, supra note 150, at 122-54.
167 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
168 Id. at 155-56.
169 Id. at 156.
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ment' ' t7 0 is sufficiently great. It went on to refer to the federal definition of pet-
ty crimes as those punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment or a
$500 fine, suggested that objective criteria are important, but concluded that
"[w]e need not.., settle in this case the exact location of the line between petty
offenses and serious crimes," since a potential two-year prison sentence was
clearly sufficiently serious to call for a jury trial. 171 In a companion case, Bloom
v. Illinois, 172 the Supreme Court reached the same result in regard to the im-
position of a two-year prison sentence for criminal contempt.
In Duncan, the Court focused upon the potential punishment which an in-
dividual faced. Duncan had in fact been sentenced only to sixty days' im-
prisonment and a fine of $150. 173 It was, however, the potential sentence of two
years, consistent with the Court's emphasis in Duncan upon objective stan-
dards, which triggered the sixth amendment. Only in Bloom, when no max-
imum sentence for contempt existed, did the actual sentence imposed become
critical.1 74
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court seems to have focused upon
the actual sentence, rather than the potential sentence, as the relevant determi-
nant in assessing when constitutional protections are triggered. Scott v. Il-
linois175 involved the sixth amendment right to appointed counsel, rather than
jury trial. While the plurality opinion176 rejected wholesale transposition of
criteria between the jury trial and counsel provisions of the sixth amendment, it
suggested that this was because of a broader availability of right to counsel.
The Court then held that the sentence actually imposed (here only a $50 fine)
rather than the potential sentence ($500 fine or one year in jail or both) con-
trolled, and that counsel need not be appointed unless some actual imprison-
ment is imposed. If actual sentence controls for the broader counsel provisions,
a fortiori it should control for the narrower jury trial guarantee. Indeed that
problem was the point of Justice Blackmun's dissent. He assumed, however,
that authorized rather than actual sentence sufficed for purposes of the jury
trial guarantee; he argued that the right to appointed counsel "extends at least
as far" as the right to jury trial. 177 The plurality appears to agree that right to
counsel is at least as broad as the right to jury trial. The plurality, however, ap-
pears to reject the notion that authorized sentence, rather than actual sentence,
still controls for jury trial determinations.
If this analysis of Scott is accurate, it carries important implications when
read together with the earlier Supreme Court case of Muniz v. Hoffman.' 78
Muniz involved a jury trial claim by a labor union. The Court, however, made
it clear that the sixth amendment considerations were similar to those applied
170 Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 161-62.
172 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
173 391 U.S. at 146.
174 391 U.S. at 211.
175 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979).
176 Justice Powell, whose vote was necessary to make a majority, concurred on the basis of the stare
decisis effect of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), although he continued to disagree with Arger-
singer. 99 S. Ct. at 1162-63.
177 Id. at 1170-71.
178 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
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to large corporations. 179 Muniz involved a criminal contempt charge. Of
course, under Bloom, the Court had always focused upon the actual penalty im-
posed, rather than the potential penalty, in contempt cases because of the
absence of specified maximum sanctions for criminal contempt. After Scott,
however, this focus upon actual sentence would appear to apply to all types of
criminal charges. In Muniz, the Court held that the ii'nposition of a $10,000 fine
against a labor union was not sufficiently serious to require a jury trial:
It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individual's liberty beyond a six-
month term should not be imposed without the protections of a jury trial, but
it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the circumstances, a jury is re-
quired where any fine greater than $500 is contemplated. From the standpoint
of determining the seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible
deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are intrinsically
different. It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a
serious matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the
possibility of a $501 fine would be considered a serious risk'to a large corpora-
tion or labor union. Indeed although we do not reach or decide the issue
tendered by the respondent-that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial
in any criminal contempt case where only a fine is imposed on a corporation or
labor union ... we cannot say that the fine of $10,000 imposed on Local 70 in
this case was a deprivation of such magnitude that ajury should have been in-
terposed to guard against bias or mistake. 180
The results of Muniz and Scott suggest that in many criminal prosecutions
where the fine imposed is small in comparison to the resources of a large cor-
poration, no jury trial right exists. Since, of course, a corporation never faces
imprisonment, a jury trial denial based upon magnitude of fine becomes a
possible issue in most corporate prosecutions. Such an approach, however, is
subject to two types of criticism. The first relates to the difficulties in making a
case-by-case determination of the impact of a fine of a particular amount on a
specific corporate defendant. 8 It is problematic, however, whether the dif-
ficulty involved requires a greater expenditure of resources than is involved in
the added cumbrousness of a jury trial. At any rate, the Supreme Court in
Muniz rejected the bright line drawn by federal statute between fines of not
more than $500 and fines of a greater amount. It stated that this statutory line
has "no talismanic significance."
1 8 2
The second criticism is more serious. If a preliminary decision is made to
deny a request for jury trial, the judge has decided before considering the rele-
vant evidence that the sentence imposed will be limited. In so doing, he has
"abandon[ed] his responsibility to consider the full range of punishments
established by the legislature." 8 3 This objection, however, may be met in the
corporate context by basing the jury decision upon the maximum authorized
penalty that may in fact be imposed in the case upon any state of the evidence.
179 Id. at 477.
180 Id.
181 See United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977); Douglass v. First Nat'l Rity. Corp.,
543 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
182 Id. at 477. The statutory provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976).
183 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Thus a charge under a statute providing for sentences of up to one year im-
prisonment or a fine not exceeding $10,000, or both, could lead at most to a
$10,000 fine for a corporate defendant. An assessment of the impact of that
potential fine could be made in determining the right, vel non, to a jury trial.
This approach poses one additional anomaly, suggested by Justice
Douglas's dissent in Muniz. 1 84 Insofar as a governmental action to impose a
civil penalty is provided as an alternative enforcement mechanism for the same
conduct that is the subject of a criminal prosecution, the seventh amendment
may provide a jury trial for cases involving a civil penalty of over $20. The
Supreme Court has since held in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Commis-
sion185 that the seventh amendment does not bar Congress from assigning to an
administrative agency, without jury, the right to impose civil penalties for
violation of statutorily created public rights. However, the opinion suggests
that if Congress vests original jurisdiction in the courts in actions to impose
such penalties, ajury trial will be required. 1 86 This anomaly, of course, extends
further. Any definition of petty criminal offenses that permits a fine of over $20
to be imposed without jury trial creates the same anomaly. It may well be an
insoluble problem resulting from the peculiarly rigid dollar amount drafted in-
to the seventh amendment, and from the insistence upon the noncriminal
nature of "civil" penalties. The Court in Atlas Roofing concludes with a foot-
note that recognizes the dilemma:
[I]f the fines involved in these cases were made criminal fines instead of civil
fines, the Seventh Amendment would be inapplicable by its terms. The Sixth
Amendment would then govern ... and ... no jury trial would be required.
... It would be odd to hold that Congress could avoid the jury-trial require-
ment by labeling the civil penalties criminal fines but not by assigning their
adjudication to an administrative agency. 187
V. Conclusion
A justifiable analysis of the criminal liability of the corporate entity may be
elusive. No such analysis will be found unless the appropriate questions are
asked. The corporation is a legal creation permitting the association of
numerous individuals to carry out an economic enterprise. Its organizational
nature is often overlooked. If the corporation's true form is hidden by legal fic-
tions relating to "personhood," proper analysis for purposes of the criminal
law is impaired. A "cult of personality" may be at least as dangerous here as in
contexts less hospitable to the business corporation.
Large publicly held corporations assume a type of power and influence
which is qualitatively different from those obtainable even by wealthy in-
184 422 U.S. at 478-81.
185 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
186 Id. at 458-61. See also United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103, 115 (1909); United States v. Jepson, 90 F.Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950); Note, 53 TEx. L. REv. 387,
392 (1975).
187 430 U.S. at 460 n.15. The penalties at issue were in amounts of $5,000 and $600 respectively im-
posed on corporations.
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dividuals. This is often relevant to legal determinations relating to traditional
questions of "corporate law." It is often overlooked when courts deal instead
with "criminal law" matters. A rational system of criminal justice cannot ig-
nore factors that appear so clearly relevant in civil law contexts.
